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The East Japan Great Earthquake and Tsunami 11th March 2012 and the 
following meltdown in the local economy of the devastated areas have confronted our 
economic policies with unprecedented challenges. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine an effectiveness of the trust system as a means of reviving the economic 
function of regions hit by the disaster. 
Our discussions are basically constructed upon two perspectives. First, the revival 
of the economic function from the earthquake should be understood as asset 
transformation from existing managers whose economic resources are lost by the 
earthquake to new and active managers with productive investment opportunities and 
management skills. In other words, we need some devices or institutions that bound old 
and new managers together. Without such devices, existing managers would be stuck 
with the status quo, i.e., they have to keep standing in front of the damaged assets, 
without the done way2.  
Secondly, we can say that trust system can play an important role as the 
intermediary in the sense of last paragraph, to channel some assets between deferent 
economic agents. Good example is a bequest that is a property repeatedly transferred 
between generations. However, there is sharp contrast between the earthquake-hit 
assets and bequests. In the latter case, a successor (heir, heiress) has normally an 
enough incentive to accept the inherited assets, but it must be hard to expect that 
earthquake-damaged assets can easily find the person with an incentive to succeed the 
damaged asset and try to make profit by utilizing them. In what follows, with 
considering the fact that the damaged economic resources cannot be activated as they 
are, we state the special characteristic of the trust system can be used to utilize such the 
resources. 
                                                   
1 This research is granted by Nomura Foundation. The author appreciates very much to the 
Foundation and its committee. Remaining errors are needless to say my sole 
responsibilities.   
2 Of course, an existing manager and a new manager may be identical. However, it is worth 




Our discussions are structured as follows. First we schematically illustrate the 
transfer process of damaged properties which is consisted from two different parts. Next, 
conflicts of interest between the existing property owner and the trust system is 
examined, during the first part of the process. In addition, the second part of the process, 
from the trust system to a new manager, is clarified, from the viewpoint of maintenance 
of the productivity of the resource. Based on these analyses, the reasons why trust 
system is beneficial and useful as the reconstruction schemes. Finally, some policy 
implications obtained from such a theoretical discussion are stated. In the theoretical 
analysis on the process, the results of the previous works of the author are intensively 
used3. 
 
2．Reconstruction Scheme as an Asset transformation Mechanism4  – overview - 
 
    From the view point of recovering the socio-economic structure from the 3.11 
disaster, the problem we are confronting with is how we can restore the devalued assets, 
which will be a cradle for the profitable economic activities in future. This needs to 
channel the damaged assets from the exiting owners (person who was directly hit by the 
earthquake) to new owners who have the productive investment opportunities.  
Similar situations are often observed when we are interested in the succession of 
business which has recently been attracting much attention in most aging-society, like 
Japan. By paying attentions to conflicts of interest between an incumbent managers 
and the new managers, Fukaura(2012) analyzed the conditions for smooth succession of  
business and he discussed the situations under which the succession would fail. 
According to his discussion, if incumbent managers’ time preferences are enough small 
and the set-up cost for new enterprise for young generation is enough small, the former 
hopes for the succession of business to young generation and the latter prefers to start 
its own business newly. As a result, conflicts of interests are caused between two 
generations. 
One possible remedy for this hazard is to set-up the conduits which keeps the 
ownership of the existing business temporarily and channels it to a new business 
manager. Here, candidates for a new manager should be recruited from not only the 
relatives of incumbents but also the outsiders. Although details are left to the original 
                                                   
3 In what follows, we use a word “trust system” to show an economic entity that acts as 
trustee. So it includes “trust company”.   
4 In this article, “reconstruction” implies a full recovery of socio-economic system from the 
disasters. On the other hand, “restoration” means a repairmen or amendment of 
infrastructures, such as power supply, immediately after the disasters.       
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paper, the point here is the establishment of conduits that keeps and passed the some 
economic assets. In other words, this is the succession of business with an intermediary. 
To maximize the benefit of succession of business, this conduit must hold existing 
assets’ value constant at least, or improve it if possible. A trust system makes a sense in 
this context, because it is a tax-neutral entity and value of trusted asset can be 
appreciated if an able-trustee is nominated.   
Our starting point is to apply this results Reconstruction scheme. See Figure1 that 
shows our analytical framework schematically. Here, current generation is the 
generation who ran the corporation when the earthquake occurred. His/her business 
was heavily damaged by the disaster and lost its worth. Although businesses have to be 
restored and revived because it contributes to the over-all socio-economic reconstruction, 
it must be very hard to make a firm and optimistic expectation for future business 
environments. This means the immediate re-start and rehabilitation of damaged assets 




     The alternative way is to introduce an intermediary between damaged and 
recovered assets. In the following discussion, Transfer I (II) means the first (last) parts 
of this channeling process. However, this intermediation is worthless unless conduits 
can verify that the value of recovered asset is higher than the damaged one. Hence, for 
well-functioned asset transformation, conduits must have the ability to deal with two 
impediments, (1) to eliminate conflicts of interest between existing manager and 





(1) Conflicts of interest 
     Because the value of assets hit by the earthquake is deeply depreciated, conflicts 
of interest between the current and future managers remain. That means that no one 
has an incentive to acquire them for their future businesses. On the other hand, the 
existing managers try to pass the damaged assets to the new managers to revive them. 
These conflicts cannot be removed unless conduits can improve the asset value to the 
level enough to form an expectation that those assets are profitable.  
It is worthwhile to note that “recovering asset value” does not mean the direct 
improvements of asset value, such as installing new machines, building new factory, etc. 
Instead, in the case of 3.11 disasters, improvement of business environments, like 
restoration of infra-structure, special legal arrangements for disposing the assets etc. is 
classified into “recovering will contribute to “recovering asset value”. To improve the 
asset directly          
 
(2) Productive manager  
     An importance of lessening conflicts of interest is to be remembered, however, it is 
only a sufficient condition for well-performed asset transformation process. Because if 
the new manager who takes over the assets are not necessary an able-manager to run 
firms by using the succeeded assets, then the ultimate purpose to recover the 
socio-economic foundation will end to failure.  
This is perfectly the same situation, in the succession of business, that an 
incapable manager, such as extravagant son, spoils the parents’ business. Even if 
damaged assets are restored by conduits in the above sense, that asset does not yield 
any profit, without any productive decision-makings by the new manager, for example, 
equipping new facilities or machines, optimizing the human resource allocation, etc. 
These activities are direct improvement of assets by managers that should be 
distinguished from the indirect improvements by conduits. In order to complete the 
asset transformation process, conduits have to allocate the recovered assets to able 
managers who have an incentive to take over the recovered assets and start new stage 
of business, which leads the full-seize recovery of devastated area5.  
 
3  Transferring Damaged Assets into Trusted Asset transformation I 
   
Transfer I is a process that promotes the flow of damaged assets to a trust system, 
                                                   
5 It is rational to say that these two requirements, potential assets and able manager, are 
very general requirements for the health businesses.  
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which includes some effort to appreciate an economic value of those assets, just as 
mentioned before. Or, we can say Transfer I is a process that a trust system sorts out 
the good assets with high potentiality for the prospective businesses from the bad ones.  
     For simplicity, we here ignore asymmetric information – a situation that arise 
when the future managers’ insufficient knowledge about the damaged assets or their 
holders interferes with the efficient functioning of asset markets – because our 
discussions will focus on the physical qualities of the damaged assets. This specifies the 
special role of conduits, that is, conduits act as physical property improvers, not as 
information producers within Transfer I6.          
     One way, and alternative way, to describe the effects of damaged assets is to say 
that they make conflicts of interest between owners of damaged assets and conduits. 
Because assets that are damaged physically, socially and economically are not profitable, 
any economic agents, even if those are conduits, would not buy them for their own 
businesses. This does not align the incentives of current owners with those of others 
who are competent, because damaged assets’ owners have an incentive to dispose that 
assets or hand over them to other person. Therefore, with setting aside the technical or 
engineering aspects of recovering damaged assets, the key to change situations is to 
make two agents (existing owners and conduits) incentive-compatible.     
     We are now in the place where we can apply the discussions developed by 
Fukaura(2011), which has formalized the hazards for a smooth succession of business in 
the contexts of conflicts of interest between old managers and young (prospected) 
managers.  
His discussion can be summarized as follows: typically smooth succession of 
business is hindered when old manager plans to hand over his business to young 
manager, the latter (for example son of old manager) denies to do it. This is mainly 
because costs for starting-up a new business for young manager (= he/she prefers to run 
his/her own business to succeed parent’s business) is expected to be low than the costs to 
take over the existing businesses. This makes the young manager refuse the succession. 
On the other hand, if the time preference of old manager is so small, then he considers 
the succession of business is also beneficial for his son, too. This causes the conflicts of 
                                                   
6 Most elementary textbooks teach us that financial intermediaries play an important role 
as the information producers because of asymmetric information in financial markets. In 
general, asymmetric information problems cannot be ignored in the confused society, like 
Japan after 3.11 earthquakes, however, in this paper, we concentrate the other aspect of 
social confusion that is caused by the physical/geographical damage of social infrastructures. 
Further, it is safe to say that the situations or circumstance of the devastated region are 
widely known.            
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interest between two generations7.  
In the consideration of reconstruction from the earthquake, owners/managers of 
damaged assets correspond to old managers and prospective managers who may take 
over the assets are a counterpart of young managers. The formers try to hand over the 
damaged assets to the people who use them as the income-earning assets8. Accordingly, 
the two roles of conduits that intermediate two managers is derived from the above. 
 
3-1 costs for succeeding the existing business 
First, conduits must be structured to minimize the costs for succeeding the 
existing business, compared to starting-up new business, which include activities like 
providing information about current assets, collecting information about local market or 
industries, and so on. More importantly, during the reconstruction-phase, it is very 
likely that urgent or emergent measures are necessary. This would be a time-consuming 
and costly process for the damaged asset’s owners then he needs someone to help him. 
To reflect the necessity of such measures to the administration, it is necessary to 
summarize the requests by the individual managers, with considering the current 
business environment. Further, transferring the assets needs long legal documents with 
provisions that restrict and specify certain activities that the related managers 
concerned can engage in. This role must be greater in the reconstruction phase from 
natural disasters, because legal legislations that has never been before are required9.   
Hence, we can say that the smaller role played by individual manager in the 
reconstruction process leaves a greater and wider role played by conduits. In other 
words, conduits with high degree of freedom, i.e., huge discretion on decision making, 
are desirable. Fortunately, a trust system enjoys some preferable features in this point, 
for example, trustees can discretionally manage/operate the trusted property, trusted 
property has an independence (trusted property is nobody’s property), etc. Section 3 will 
explore more detail discussions about the usefulness of a trust system as conduits.      
 
                                                   
7 For an in-depth discussion, see Fukaura(2012). 
8 There is a big difference between succession of business and reconstruction. In succession 
of business, the young managers’ decision makings are heavily restricted or bind by the ones 
of first generation managers. This is because of time lags between two generations’ decision 
makings, that is, very often parent’s decisions are given and predetermined when son makes 
his own decision making. In the case of reconstruction, prospective future managers’ 
decisions are dominant over the damaged asset holders’ decision making.       
9 In normal situation, complicated legal arrangements are needed in the successions of 
business too. But in normal circumstances, managers and lawyer can refer the precedents. 
As to the reconstruction process from the disaster once every 100 years, no precedents are 
available.    
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3-2 time preference of current managers 
Second role of conduits is to keep the time preference of current manager low. 
When the time preference, representing the effects of “impatience”, is low, the lighter 
future utility is discounted. This means current managers have a tendency to attach 
more importance to “future” than “present”, therefore, in successions of business, such 
managers try to find an opportunity to hand over the businesses in order not to 
terminate them. By analogy, we can regard that his time preference is low (high), if the 
current manager considers keeping his business (to go out of business) after 3.11 
disasters.      
Needless to say, keeping the business after 3.11 is the most powerful driving force 
for the reconstruction of the socio-economic structure from the earthquake, although 
some current managers would be replaced with new ones. Namely, people's minds 
should be social and future-oriented, that is to say, the time preference of current 
managers should be kept low during the reconstruction process.     
     It is rational here to summarize the foregoing discussions that show some 
important requirements that help Transfer I more effective. Conduit, an entity to 
intermediate existing managers and future managers, should eliminate the costs paid 
by the prospective managers for succeeding the damaged assets, with keeping the time 
preference of the current manager low. The first task pave the way on which the future 
managers start the activities to revive businesses and the second task provides the 
canvas on which the current managers draw the picture of future image of the 
businesses.  
In the context of the trust-system, assets in bad shape are trusted to conduits 
(trustees) and the damaged assets sorted out by conduits transmogrify it to the trusted 
assets. Damaged assets has no potential for the productive activities, on the other hand, 
trusted assets has the potential that is not cultivated yet. In the later section, we will 
more closely discuss the useful and desirable features of “trust” to pursue the above 
strategies.  
 
4 Transferring Trusted Assets into Recovered Assets: Transfer II 
    
     In short, Transfer I is the remedy process that removes the technical and social 
hazards that keep away the prospective new managers from entering the reconstruction 
businesses. However, this does not guarantee the person who shows some appetites to 
take over the damaged assets is an able manager or not. Because this study is 
considering the reconstruction scheme by recovering the damaged assets’ economical 
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potentiality, we can say the transfer of assets is successful only if the transferred assets 
are managed with equal efficiency at least or more efficiently if possible. The reason is 
clear and simple: trusted assets need a high management skill to realize its productive 
potential. Without such a skill, nobody can recover the value of assets and make profits.  
In this sense, Transfer II completes the transferring process. 
  Prior to develop the formal model to describe this point, take a soccer game for 
instance. In the close game, some members are changed at the last phase of the game, 
by replacing tired players with new players (for example, during the last 10 minutes of 
second half). This is the important tactics to maintain the team-power. However, to 
maintain the team-power as before, an alternative player should be able player at least 
as the former player. If not, member-change does not contribute to win the game. 
     Similar problem arises in the reconstruction scheme from the earthquake – 
managers of damaged assets and managers of recovered assets. Suppose that existing 
manager is an excellent entrepreneur, however, cannot run firms because he was 
heavily injured by the earthquake. However, if his son who takes over a firm would not 
have an enough incentive to be a good manager like his father or be incompetent, his 
business would go into bankruptcy, even though the company’s facilities are not 
damaged. That is, new manager should be capable manager like old manager, or be 
more capable one, because new manager must face with the social environment that 
might be more severe after the disaster. On the contrary, only if corporations that were 
managed by a good manager was transferred to another excellent manager, such 
succession of business would contribute to improve an efficiency and to revive the 
devastated area. In what follows, we state the formal model to describe this story.                 
 
4-1 succession of business and labor productivity 
   Our analytical framework is summarized as follows; we can regard the succession 
of businesses as a kind of human resource management. That is, a firm can replace 
some workers during the working hours or production period. In the succession of 
business, during the lifetime of firms, the managers are replaced. Of course, managers 
are not identical to workers, however, both managers and workers belong to the 
category of human resource. Thus, if we construct a theoretical and microeconomic 
model for analyzing the workforce management, we can expect to derive some 
interesting implications that contribute to understand the succession of business.              
  
○strategy I; Benchmark strategy 
     Here, 
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     ( )LfY =                                    ･･･ (1) 
is the well-behaved production function of the existing firm, where L is labor input and
Y is output produced. As Figure 2 illustrtes, which shows the production function, 
indicates when maxL is employed then maxY is produced, for example. At  ( maxL , maxY ), 
total wage bill is  
( ) maxmax1 LLfW ′=                          ･･･ (2) 
and firm’s profit is 
( ) maxmaxmax1 LLfpY ′−=π 10                   ･･･ (3) 
 
○strategy II ; separating workers (identical production function) 
    Now, suppose firm lies off a part of workers whose marginal productivity is 
relatively small and replaces them with newly hired workers – total employment is 
constant. Then workers ( FLL −max ), whose marginal productivities are low, experience 
the lay-off and remaining workers FL produce FY .  
    
 
 
                                                       (**) 
maxY                    ( )LfY =  
          FY                                     
(*) 
 




                                 FL             maxL  
Figure 2 
     This kind of replacement of workers, i.e., substituting workers with high 
productivity for workers with low-productivity, looks like profitable if new workers’ 
production,      
( )Fn LLfY −= max                       ･･･(4) 
is equal to the contribution lost by laid-off workers. This can be attained when new 
                                                   
10 Here we assume the labor and goods markets are competitive. Then wage is determined 
by the workers’ marginal productivity. 




workers have the same production function as the unemployed workers, that is, in 
Figure 2, the new workers’ production function have the identical shape as the second 
part of the original one starting from（ FL 、 FY ）) as shown by (*). Now, firm can produce 
FY  by existing workers and FYY −max by newly hired workers. Because total production 
is still maxY  then firm’s revenue is constant.   
However, total wage bill is given by 
( ) ( )( )FFF LLLfLLfW −′+′= maxmax2  .             ･･･(5) 
This means firm’s profit is decreased by 
( ) ( )( )max12 LfLfLWW ff −′=− .                          ･･･(6) 
This is because that this firm is operating the deal wage systems, the one is applied to 
the existing workers whose wage is determined by )( FLf ′ and the other is wage scheme 
for new employed workers with )( maxLf ′ . Decreasing of revenue is natural result from 
higher wages for new workers, with holding the total production constant. 
Therefore, we can safely state that this kind of substitution of workers where 
unskilled workers are replaced by other workers whose productivity is same, is not 
desirable11. 
 
○strategy III ; separating workers (improved production function) 
   On the contrary, if firm can find workers whose marginal productivity is higher 
than fired worker ( FLL −max ), such a replacement is surely profitable for firm. For 
example, suppose newly employed workers’ marginal productivity is identical to the 
first part of existing workers’ ones, that is, firm employs new workers of FLL −max , and 
their production functions, notated by (**) , are identical to the first part of original one 
which start from the origin. As illustrated by dotted line, existing workers’ production 
function is reproduced from( FL 、 FY ）. In another way to say this, the production 
activities that corresponds to the region from the origin to （ FL 、 FY ）is repeated, first 
by existing workers and later by new employed workers. Here, total output reaches 
)2(max ×= FYY , which is beyond maxY , hence,   
                                                   
11 It is likely that a firm considers it can reduce the wage bill by replacing some full-timers 
who engaged in the simple-routine works with part-timers whose wages are low. However, 
facing with the change of employment strategy, full-timers with high skill may demand a 
rise in wages. Under the dual wage standards, workers can easily compare their own wages 
with others. Then workers who have high, firm-specific skills may pursue the more 
aggressive wage negotiations. 
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( ) ( )( )FFFF LLLLfLLfW −−′+′= maxmax3              ･･･(7) 
gives the total wage bill. 
     For simplicity, assume FLL 2max = . Total wage bill and profit can be rewritten as  
( ) ( ) ( ) FFfFFF LLfLLfLLfW ′=′+′= 23               ･･･(11)  
( ) ( ){ }FFFFFF LLfYLLfY ′−=′−= 2223π              ･･･(12) 
We know ( ) ( ) FF LLfYLLfY 22maxmaxmaxmax1 ′−=′−=π  from the former discussion, 
thus, ( ) ( ){ }FF LfLfYY 22maxmax ′−′>−                 ･･･(13) 
should be kept for 31 ππ < , which means this replacement of workers is worthwhile for 
firms. An important point to recognize is that an increment of wage bill resulted from 
this rearrangement of workers should be covered by an increment of revenue. In short, 
two different types of workers are employed simultaneously, that is, the manager should 
take into account of the difference of shape of each worker’s production function, which 
determines the profitableness for firms.  
This is our first finding that can be explained intuitively as follows. Under the 
normal situation with well-behaved production function, worker’s marginal productivity 
would be decreasing. Here consider the following working-hour management that half 
of workers work from 9:00am to 1:00pm and another half works from 1:00pm to 5:00pm. 
If all workers have the same productivity, this system can guarantee the replication of 
production function from（ FL 、 FY ）, shown in Figure 2.  
Therefore, it is very easy to say, in order to pursue this employment strategy 
(separating workers strategy), that firms need to keep the productivities of both groups 
of workers same level. However, this is not easy task for the managers, because, in 
many cases, such a separation of workers is applied by replacing full timers with 
part-timers, whose productivities are generally low. Further, under this strategy, total 
wage bills are simply calculated by “wage rate per hour×working hours”, then if  
working hours are same, each workers' income may be decreased. To examine these 
points in detail, see Figure 2 again.  
 
 ○strategy IV ; united workers (improved production function) 
maxY indicates the maximum production when two types of workers are employed 
simultaneously and both groups’ production functions are identical, i.e., ( )LfY = . Here 
we can assume a hypothetical production function, ( )LFY = , which achieves maxY  
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without separating the workers. At a glance, we recognize ( )LFY =  is obtained by 




Y (>1), just like the shift of production function by the 
technological progress. Let us consider the case when a firm employs maxL  whose 
productivity is ( )LFY = .  This corresponds to the new employment strategy that t a 
firm can do its business under ( )LFY =  without separating workers. Now we know 
total wage bill and firm’s profit are given by  










YY ′−=π                    ･･･(14)  
By mentioning the former discussions, we know,
( ) ( )
( )















































which shows firm’s profit is increased proportionally with the shift of its production 
function. At the same time, total wage bill is also increased because the marginal 
productivity is increased. Thus we can say this shift of production function is desirable 
both for a firm and workers. 
     Next, let us compare (14) with (11) and (12). For simplicity, we use wf =′ , 
L
C
wf 0+=′  and FLL 2max = 12 .Then we have 
                                                   
12 Original production function is given by ( )LNfY = , where L is working hours and N is 
number of worker. Total wage bill is ( )NwLCW += 0 , where 0C is fixed cost per workers 
and w is wage rate per hour. Then firm’s profit π is ( ) ( )NwLCLNpfWpY +−=−= 0π . 
From here, we can get first order conditions for optimization as wf =′  and
L
C
wf 0+=′ . 
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Y , (16) is positive so total wage bill is increased13。 
On the other hand, comparing firm’s profit by (12) to (19), with remembering 
FYY 2max = and FLL 2max = , yields  
( ) ( ){ }
































The sign of (17) is positive if  





=α  ,vice versa,  . ･･･(18). 
If 1=α , (18) is always positive under the well behaved production function. The right- 
hand side shows the unit labor cost when the damaged assets are reconstructed and full 
employment is regained. The left-hand side represents the unit labor cost before the 
reconstruction program starts where only FL is employed. Hence, (18) shows that firm’s 
profit is increased if a firm can keep its unit labor cost lower than the former wage level, 
in other words, (18) determines the upper limit of wage per worker at maxL  when the 
recovery is completed.  
This conclusion is straightforward because our model assumes implicitly the price 
is constant or one14. Therefore, technological growth brings the increase in unit wage 
                                                   
13 The following discussions do not change essentially even if we apply more general 
definition as )1max >= αα （　FLL . 
14 Alternatively speaking, we do not consider the change of price. Needless to say this 
simplification does not mean that we may able to ignore the movement of price of goods. 
However, when the economy of the damaged regions is going through a highly tough 
situation after the earthquake, it is not irrational to assume that strong deflationary 
14 
 
and the decrease in profit when a firm employs the same number of workers and faces 
with the same price of goods. If the prices of goods produced under a new production 
function are appreciated after the reconstruction activities, firm’s profit will be 
increased as well. Following table and Figure 3 is summarizing the discussions. 
 
Strategy Profit Wage bill Resulted point 
I; Benchmark strategy 1π  1W  E0 
II ; separating workers 
( identical f ) 
<2π 1π  >2W 1W  E0 
III; separating workers 
(improved f ) 3
π > 1π  13 WW >  
E2 
IV; united workers 
(improved f ) 
1ππ >  1WW >  
π  ⋛ 3π  3WW >  
 
4-2 model’s implications for Transfer II  
Above discussion is, needless to say, the framework to analyze the succession 
of business. However, we are sure that this model is highly applicable when we 
consider the way to channel the damaged assets from existing managers to 
prospective managers.   
Assets transferred to conduits are generally damaged by the earthquake. 
Suppose the performance before the earthquake is（ maxL 、 maxY ）and ( FL 、 FY ）after 
the disaster. Here, notice conduits accept asset at  ( FL 、 FY ）, which jeopardizes the 
regional economy by creating unemployment of maxL － FL  and loss of products of maxY
－ FY . By referring Table and Figure 3, we can categorize the reconstruction scheme into 
three types.  
○ simple reconstruction scheme(strategy II) 
This scheme corresponds to the strategy II in above Table, in which the situation 
before the earthquake is simply reproduced（（II）in Figure 3）. To put it concretely, lost 
resources, including physical assets and human assets, have to be restored, identically 
with the former circumstance. Hence, this strategy determines the minimum level any 
reconstruction program should accomplish15.  
                                                                                                                                                     
pressures exist.     
15 If the economy locates at En, the economy is not recovered because En< FY . However, we 
cannot evaluate the outcome of the reconstruction scheme if EM results, because EM < maxY . 
15 
 
It is not unreasonable to say the economy at E0 is a recovered economy, however, if 
we take into account of years consumed for recover-process, which normally takes long 
years, even if E0 is attained, economic growth that would have been obtained during 
these years cannot be recovered. If we consider these sunk costs, next two schemes are 
more desirable. However, because this brings the decrease in firms’ profit as shown 
before ( <2π 1π ) in the short run, this option is not accepted by firms. In the damaged 
economy or region, this might strongly discourage entrepreneurs from engaging in such 
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                                 FL             maxL  
Figure 3 
 
○ reconstruction scheme with improved productivity(strategy III) 
This scheme corresponds to the strategy III in above Table, in which the resulted 
economy would be beyond maxY 16（（III）in Figure 3） To put it concretely, new production 
processes should be established and they employ the second part of labor force  maxL －
FL  ,on the other hand, survived firms keep their employment FL  and follow an old 
technology then full employment is achieved. However, notice a technology level of maxL
－ FL  must be improved as shown by dotted line in Figure 2. This corresponds to the 
theoretical expression that the identical production function is reproduced from E1. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Only when the economy is at maxY or over, the reconstruction program is to be successful.   
16 Intuitively, we may say sunk costs mentioned above are recovered, although this 
statement is contradictory to the definition of sunk costs. 
 
maxY  
E0 : before earthquake 
E1 after earthquake 
= damaged asset 
  
E2 : recovered asset 
16 
 
Firm’s profit is increased as derived before.  
Here we have some interesting implications. Very often, after the economic 
framework is badly damaged by some reasons such as 3.11 disasters, it is described that 
it is a heaven-sent opportunity for upgrading the industrial structure, by establishing a 
cutting-edge industries. Because, normally, new industries are supposed to coexist with 
survived old industries, this is equal to emphasis that a part of work force is employed 
by the existing firms and remaining part of workers gets their jobs at the new industries. 
Needless to say, intensive training programs must be provided to the workers in new 
industries.  
 
○ reconstruction scheme with integrated work force(strategy IV) 
This scheme corresponds to the strategy IV in above Table, in which the resulted 
economy reaches to maxY （（IV）in Figure 3 and full employment is secured at maxL . 
Critical difference from strategy III is that this strategy needs to an overall 
improvement of the regional production function. In strategy III, technological progress 
occurs only in new industries. Conversely, in strategy IV, productivity increases must 
appear all over the economy, which means the region-wide vocational training programs 
are to be organized. 
In the earlier section, we explored a discussion about the short-run effects posed 
by technological progress. It brings a decline in profit, but workers are fully employed 
and the price level is kept constant. Here we have to confront a trade-off; the more 
emergent victim's life rebuilding is, the higher priority is given to providing the 
employment opportunities, which costs firms the loss of profitability. However, we can 
expect some long-run effects as well. If a firm successfully installs new technologies and 
allocates trained workers on it, the value-added goods are produced and supplied to the 
market. Such goods will be highly evaluated in the marketplace, which lead the 
increase in firms’ profit in future17.  
 
5 Trust system and Reconstruction Process  
 
                                                   
17 In this sense, technological progress we discussed here can be interpreted as a process of 
structural change. Damages due to natural disasters make clear what vulnerability to the 
natural disasters the damaged regions have. Then in many cases, some reconstruction 
programs include not only simple restorations but also a huge-scale economic restructuring 




5-1 Two types of asset transformation 
 Up to this point, we have investigated a mechanism of the succession of business 
by generalizing it as the transformation mechanism of assets between different 
economic agents. This last section presents some proposals to establish the effective 
reconstruction scheme after the 3.11 disasters, by mentioning several implications 
derived from above considerations. Especially, understanding the role of trust system as 
a conduit will occupy us in this section. 
Let’s start by looking at what our discussion has found so far. Although we have 
derived many results which are closely related with each other, the most important ones 
are twofold.  
The first point is that the rate of time preference of existing managers (managers 
of damaged assets) should be low. In other words, to encourage an asset transformation, 
owners of damaged assets should not be myopic, instead should have long-term view. 
However, as we can easily imagine, it is very plausible that the managers of damaged 
assets, who is likely to be victims of the disasters, is rather short-sighted because they 
might be deeply obsessed with finding a way of going through daily life. Here we have to 
ask how trust system can overcome these hardships and what an essential attribute of 
trust system for this point is.    
The point we emphasis next is that conduits should have the ability (1) to 
consolidate economic resources that have scattered and lost due to the disasters and (2) 
to introduce the technical improvement which perfectly fits the trusted assets’ 
characteristics. Because this requirement will guarantee the economy will follow the 
pass labeled (IV). Please note here the first point is crucial for Transfer I and second for 
Transfer II, both of which needs to complete the whole reconstruction process. 
Especially, second requirement works as catalyst which sublimes a simple 
reconstruction (strategy II) to a reconstruction with technological progress (strategy 
IV). 
 
5-2 Some advantages of financial intermediaries  
As to the above two implications, trust system have the following advantages. To 
understand how trust system works, we start by confirming our theoretical foundation. 
Our discussion was originated by two primary concerns. The first one relates that 
scheme of the reconstruction programs has a common feature with the succession of 
business, and the second one is to consider the latter can be systematically analyzed by 
regarding as asset transformation between two parties. 
Just like basic textbooks tells, the process of asset transformation is carried out by 
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so-called financial intermediaries, then we have to check a list of them and find the 
preferable financial intermediary for the purpose of transforming very particular assets, 
a damaged business assets by the earthquake, with taking into account some economic 
factors that are very specific to the 3.11 disasters. 
Here the factors we have to remind are; (1) time preference of existing managers 
(owners of damaged assets) might be high because they have to secure their normal 
lives immediately, in other words, their perspectives tend to be short-sighted. (2) Of 
course, this is not be blamed, however, we should consider the special environment after 
the catastrophe, where, for example, socio-economic infrastructures, including both 
hard and soft ones, are in horribly bad shape, labor forces flowed out, etc.. This means a 
competitiveness of the region cannot be supplemented by only simple returning to the 
prior state. Hence, the damaged region should attain the long term technological growth 
which is enough to compete with other areas.  
In short, the first point reflects the short term aspect of reconstruction scheme and 
the second describes the long term aspect. We can emphasis financial intermediaries 
are very suitable to manage above factors as conduits, on two fronts as reasoned just 
after.   
○time preference and expertise of financial intermediaries 
     The first task of conduits in reconstruction program is to channel damaged assets 
from the individuals with high time preference to those whose time preference is 
relatively low. What this really means is to find the entrepreneur who can regard 
damaged assets as inputs for the worthwhile investment projects that are likely to 
reach their full potential.  
The financial intermediary is generally an expertise to find such an individual or 
institution who is not risk averse (their attitudes toward risks are relatively aggressive), 
and to find productive investment opportunities by evaluating and screening inherent 
risks in the projects. In addition, very often, they are so prominent about legal matters 
that they excel in the negotiation technique against local authority which conducts 
some regulations over devastated area. It is an expected role of financial intermediary 
that encourages the local authority to plan a policy package that allows the individuals 
in the area to benefit from engaging in setting up new businesses by using damaged 
assets.  
○technological growth and economies of scope/scale 
     As seen in the early discussion, it is natural to suppose an economic potentiality 
(productivity) of damaged area is deadly deteriorated by the earthquake. Such 
deteriorations include not only physical ones, but also damages caused by harmful 
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rumors or misinformation. Especially, the latters are hard to be denied immediately 
(sunk costs). Therefore, in order to regain competitiveness against other regions, an 
upward shift of local production function, i.e., technological growth, is necessary. 
This means the reconstruction program should not be a “get-rich-quick, in facts, in 
ordinary cases, the technological progress is caused from consolidating, exchanging and 
proliferating existing knowledge. However, it is also undeniable that the situation is 
urgent for people in the hit area. In such an emergent situation, a kind of “information 
center” is needed, which works as the hub that collects, selects and passes useful 
information to regional society. Financial intermediaries are one of the most preferable 
institutions for this purpose. This makes sense if we focus on two special advantageous 
features the financial intermediaries have, i.e., economies of scope and scale.  
As introductory textbook describes, arranging useful information becomes more 
efficient as the amount and type of information increase because information causes 
externality (information externality). Further, after information is shared by the society, 
another externality (network externality) strengthens the usefulness of information, 
knowledge and provides seeds of new technology. 
The presence of economies of scope in financial intermediaries enables them to 
collect many kinds of information at once with low costs (especially, fixed costs) due to 
economies of scale. They can provide a kind of “forum” where locals can access useful 
information and knowledge. It is no arguable that such information reshuffling is the 
decisive factor for innovation and technological progress. A point is, without any help of 
financial intermediaries, scientific knowledge spreads spontaneously in long run. 
However, in the case of emergency, the role of financial intermediaries as an 
information hub is indispensable18.       
 
5-3 venture capital vs. trust system  
    With taking into account these points we can find two candidates as conduits and 
information hubs; venture capitals and trust system. In this section, we examine the 
pros and cons of two kinds of intermediaries in turn.   
○venture capital 
With disregarding realistic aspects, a venture capital is the one which suits these 
situations. Venture capital assembles money provided by its partners and makes 
investment to budding entrepreneurs.  
                                                   
18 If we are allowed to compare the devastated region’s economy to the developing countries’ 
one, it is easy to understand the primary importance of indirect finance, in which financial 
intermediaries play great role.    
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The advantage of venture capital is its “closeness”, the fact that partners’ shares 
are not marketable ones and all shares are traded over the counter. Then, without being 
partners, investors cannot free ride on venture capital’s activities19. This enables 
investors to acquire the full benefits of investment, which makes their time preference 
keep low.   
    On the other hand, venture capital acts as pure agent of investors. It might assess 
the possibility that investors would be rewarded in future, but it doesn't necessarily to 
commit to manage budding business. Only when someone in venture capital takes a 
seat at the board of managing directors at the business, it can directly propose to install 
some cutting edge technology or make investment in which the fruits would be realized  
in far future. Therefore, it is whether venture capital can be a driving force for 
technological progress depends on the preferences of partners, i.e., if most of partners 
are short-sighted, it cannot.   
Anyway, it is safe to say that a characteristics of venture capital works as a 
mechanism to ensure low time preference in Transfer I, although it also brings the 
technological growth if it is lucky. 
   
○trust system 
Trust system has, on the other hand, some desirable attributes when we pay our 
attention to the long-run role that conduits should play. As mentioned earlier, principal 
parallels between reconstruction schemes and the business succession is starting point 
of this study. The reason why trust system is suitable for the business succession is 
because it can design forms of trust contracts in order to control existing businesses 
(=trusted assets)20. For example, under the trust act in Japan, several kind of trust 
systems have been legalized, including declaration of trust(=Jiko-shintaku) , business 
trust(=Jigyo-shintaku), individual pension trust (=Kojin-nenin-shintaku), testamentary 
trust(=Igon-shintaku), and so on. Such the wide menus of trust system illustrate the 
flexibility of design and applicability to different situations eloquently.  
By the way, recruiting innovative entrepreneurs is crucial for successful 
reconstruction program, however, innovative entrepreneurs are not necessarily the 
persons who are interested in persuading a short term gains from damaged assets. This 
                                                   
19 If shares are tradable and priced at the market, outsiders can get useful information 
about productive investment opportunities just by watching the prices of shares, i.e., highly 
priced shares mean that venture capital’s investment is successful.    
20 For example, by structuring divine trusts, incumbent manager can select his grandson as 
the successor who takes over the business, not his son who is direct legal heir. Or it is 
possible for existing manager to transfer equity claims on the income and assets of a 
business to his elder son, with entitling his younger son to control and manage a business.    
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leads us to recognize an importance of separation between equity claims on the income 
and assets of a business and claims for controlling a business. And the persons with 
technology-oriented mind are desirable as the latter.  
     In summary, as shown in Figure 4, both of venture capitals and trust system are 
powerful candidates for reconstruction scheme, while both have some shortages. Can we 





5-4 some proposals 
 
To accomplish Tranfer I and II , to satisfy two requirements and to capture each 




Reconstruction = risky projects = verification needed 





6  Summary and concluding remarks 
 
This paper has been discussing the availability of trust system as an effective 
reconstruction programs. Especially, we have paid much attention to the reality where 
restoration and reconstruction of small and medium enterprises in desparately needed. 
                                                   
21 Our discussion may be regarded as advocating the "market-oriented reconstruction 
programs". It may be true.  
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In comparing reconstruction scheme for small and medium size companies in 
damaged regions with the succession of business scheme, we can find some 
commonalities.  
First, it is necessary to raise money revive corporations. So, investors like venture 
capitals is needed. Second aspect to be considered is that the reconstruction program 
aims not to restore a status quo, but to make some technological progress. This is 
because, without any improvement of productivity, it is impossible to keep 
competitiveness against competitors in the region far from stricken areas. These 
implications are derived from the result of analyzing the structure of the succession of 
business.  
Trust system is effective as the scheme that meets these two requirements. The  
reason is trust contracts can be freely designed according to the situation over the trust 
properties. Moreover, the comparative advantages as financial intermediaries are also 
supportive. Especially, the last point clarifies the difference with the revival plan that 
an administrative organization takes the initiative. 
 
 
